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The Evolving Framework of the 
United States Export Control System: 
A Case Study in Exporting Fiber Optic Telecommunications Systems 
to the Former Soviet Union 
By Linda M. Googins 
I
n response to the dramatic changes in the politie3I 
systems of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. the United States is being forced to reconsider 
the purposes and procedures of its export control 
policy. American businesses, eager to be the first to enter 
new commercial markets, have lobbied hard to reduce the 
number of items controlled and licenses required to export 
goods to these countries. There remain, however, national 
security concerns that the political changes may not be 
permanent and the existence of large nuclear arsenals con-
tinue to pose a military threat to the West. In refonnulating 
its export control policy, the United States must attempt to 
balance these competing concerns so as to encourage the 
development of new democracies and market economies and, 
at the same time, preserve the goals of national security. 
This article will discuss first the current United States' 
export control system, specifically as it applies to the export 
of "dual use" items) to the former Soviet Union. Second, the 
role of international cooperation in restricting exports will be 
examined, focusing on the effectiveness ofCoCom.2 Finally, 
this article will examine, as a "case study," the exportation 
of fiber optic telecommunications systems to Russia. This 
particular issue has intensified the debate over export control 
policy, dividing those wishing to support the new democra-
cies with exports of high technology against those desiring to 
protect United States security interests. 
I. The Export Control System 
A. Legal Authority for Export Controls 
The legal authority for government control over ex-
ports of goods, technology or software from the United States 
derives from the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations.3 Congress, in an exercise of 
this power, has enacted several statutes relating to exports.4 
Of these acts of legislation, the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 ("EAA''), as amended,s is the most important to 
American exporters. The EAA provides the Clrganizational 
structure for the control system, and also authorizes the 
export controls for dual use items.6 
The Export Administration Act is a broad grant of 
power to the President, directing him to take action to further 
stated congressional goals. The President, in turn, has 
delegated this power to the executive agencies under the 
direction of cabinet secretaries. The Bureau of Export 
Administration ("BXA'') of the Department of Commerce is 
the principal operating unit for administering and enforcing 
the EAA.7 The substantive regulations applicable to export-
ers have been promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce in 
the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR'').! 
B. Why Control Exports? 
Under the Export Administration Act, there are three 
stated purposes for controlling exports: to protect national 
security, to further foreign policy goals, and to protect the 
domestic economy from a drain of goods in short supply.9 
For reasons of national security, the government regulates 
the export of items which are deemed important to the 
strategic and military capabilities of "controlled countries. "10 
Controlled countries consist primarily of communist coun-
tries, i.e., the People's Republic of China, countries within 
the territory formerly controlled by the Soviet Union, and the 
former Warsaw Pact allies. In comparison, foreign policy 
controls are not necessarily directed only at "controlled 
countries." They are either additional or parallel controls, 
which are implemented for the purpose of fulfilling U.S. 
foreign policy objectives.)) 
National security controls, directed at limiting other 
countries' access to strategic items, need to be maintained on 
a multilateral basis in order to beeffective.)2 Incomparison, 
foreign policy controls allow the United States to protest or 
support actions of foreign governments and have been 
effectively maintained on a unilateral basis. However, recent 
political developments in "controlled countries," combined 
With an increasing number of foreign nations capable of 
producing "strategic items" have challenged the multilateral 
framework that the United States has historically used to 
implement its national security controls. 
Breakdowns in the multilateral framework of enforce-
ment directly affect the ability of American companies to 
compete on an international level. American businesses 
desiring to export to formerly communist countries, there-
fore, are most concerned with relaxing the number of items 
and countries controlled for national security reasons. Thus, 
it is necessary to discuss the scope of controls, which items 
are controlled and what licenses are required for export. 
C. Scope of Export Controls 
Under the Export Administration Act, all commodi-
ties, technology, and software are subject to control by the 
Commerce Department whenever they are exported from the 
United States or re-exported by a U.S. or foreign person from 
any foreign country to another foreign country.13 Foreign 
origin items generally become subject to such control when 
they enter the United States and are re-exported.14 Canada 
is excepted from most, but not all, U.S. export controls, but 
has no special exceptions from re-export controls.ls 
The Commerce Department has the responsibility for 
classifying items whose export is considered particularly 
sensitive and listing those items on the "Commerce Control 
List" ("CCL'1'6 The CCL 
does not include items under 
identified by an "Export Control Classification Number" 
("ECCN'').23 The general characteristics of the item will 
guide the exporter, to the appropriate commodity group. 
Then, the particular characteristics and function of the item 
should be matched to a specific ECCN. If the export is a high 
technology item, it is likely to be subject to national security 
controls, and, therefore, will require an application for an 
"Individual Validated License. ''24 It is important to note that 
the Commerce Department imposes the task of making the 
correct classification determination on the exporter. 
Second, for each ECCN the CCL indicates the coun-
try groups to which validated licenses are required and the 
statutory basis for control. For national security control 
purposes, foreign countries are separated into seven country 
groups designated by the symbols Q, S, T, V, W, Y, andZ.2S 
The former U.S.S.R., the Baltic states, Albania, Bulgaria 
and Mongolia are included in Country Group Y.26 Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, and Hungary are in Country Group W.27 
These groups represent the "controlled countries" that have 
been identified as targets of national security controls in 
accordance with the EAA.28 
Thus, even if an item 
the exclusive jurisdiction of an-
otherU.S.agency.t' The major 
exception is for items of an 
"inherently military nature, "18 
which are subject to the Arms 
Export Control Act 
("AECA"). 19 Under the 
AECA, the Department of 
State, Office of Defense Trade 
Controls20 maintains the "Mu-
nitions Control List" and is-
UAmerican businesses . .. 
have lobbied hard to reduce 
is not a high technology item. 
it may be subject to licensing 
because of the country of 
destination. The national 
security licensing policy for 
these destinations is one of 
approval if the Bureau of 
Export Administration de-
termines that the export is 
for a civilian use or would 
the number of items con-
trolled and licenses required 
to export goods . ... " 
sues export licenses for items on that list.21 
Because the CCL covers dual use items, i.e., those 
which can be used for both military and civilian purposes, 
distinguishing between the two agencies' licensing control 
can be difficult. Thus, in order to get a proper export license, 
an exporter must first determine which government agency 
has jurisdiction. Although some changes have been made to 
alleviate this burden on American businesses, an exporter 
should still consult both the Commerce and State depart-
ments' regulations, the EAR and ITAR respectively, as 
regards to the types of items controlled by each agency. 22 
D. Export Licensing Requirements 
After determining agency jurisdiction, an exporter 
conducts a preliminary assessment of export licensing re-
quirements, taking into consideration the nature of the item, 
the country of destination, and the end-user or known end-
use. First, the nature of the commodity is taken into 
consideration when referring to the CCL to determine if an 
item is subject to any export controls. Entries on the CCL are 
otherwise not be detrimental 
to United States security.29 In addition, exports to these 
countries of CoCom30 controlled commodities (represented 
by an ECCN with suffix "A'') require review and approval 
in CoCom, unless they are covered by a "likely to be 
approved" or "favorable consideration" notation in the 
ECCN which, respectively, indicates that they are licensable 
at national discretion or licensable after notice to CoCom if 
no objection is raised within a specified time period. 
Finally, the exporter should check the list of "banned 
end-users," representing those companies which have been 
found guilty of past violations of the EAA, or are considered 
by the government to be unreliable in safeguarding exports 
against re-export.31 The exporter also is required to report 
any potential end-use of which he or she knows would be in 
violation of the export regulations. 32 Such impermissible 
end-uses would include terrorist activities or projects involv-
ing weapons of mass destruction. 
If all three of the above considerations are met, then 
the item may be shipped under a "General License. "33 
General licenses are licenses established by EAR provisions 
for which no application is required and for which no 
document is nonnally issued.34 The conditions for the use of 
these licenses are set out in 15 C.F.R. Part 771 for commodi-
ties and Part 779 for technology and software. Most non-
strategic items may be exported under a general license. 
In all other cases, an "Individual Validated License" 
is required for export. 35 An individual validated license is a 
document issued by the Bureau of Export Administration in 
response to an application filed by an exporter that autho-
rizes a specific export from the United States. These licenses 
may be subject to interagency review.36 There are also 
"Special Licenses," which are essentially multiple validated 
licenses for projects, distribution or service supply con-
tracts.3? 
II. International Cooperation in Restricting Exports 
A. CoCom: Its Role and Function38 
Since World War II, United States strategic export 
controls have operated largely within the framework of a 
multilateral arrangement with U.S. allies. In 1949, near the 
beginning of the Cold War, the Coordination Committee for 
Multilateral Controls ("CoCom") was established to coor-
dinate the restrictions on the export of scarce or strategic 
items to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and 
their allies. The participants of CoCom consist of the 
representatives of NATO, less Iceland, plus Japan and 
Australia. 
CoCom is not based on a treaty or other formal 
international agreement. The procedures and deliberations 
of CoCom are confidential. The Committee operates under 
a rule unanimity. Thus, anyone member holds veto power 
over the other members. Measures informally agreed to in 
CoCom must be implemented by laws or regulations of the 
participating governments before they acquire legal effect. 
The national security controls under the EAA are almost 
always the result of multilateral determinations made within 
CoCom. CoCom's function in the United States export 
licensing process, however, is not set forth explicitly in the 
EAR. 
The basic functions of CoCom in support of control-
ling strategic exports are: (1) to achieve agreement on 
strategic criteria for controls, (2) to formulate detailed lists 
of embargoed commodities and technical data, and (3) to 
coordinate efforts to achieve effective enforcement of the 
embargo. CoCom also reviews the export by CoCom 
members of specific proposed shipments to controlled coun-
tries. Members exchange views on export control enforce-
ment standards, but CoCom itself has no enforcement pow-
ers of its owo. 
In addition, CoCom periodically reviews and updates 
a CoCom Atomic Energy List, Munitions List, and Core 
List. The Core List, formerly the Industrial List, includes 
dual use goods and technology which are not included on one 
of the other lists. The CoCom lists are not officially 
published. However, the control lists of participating gov-
ernments are based on the CoCom lists, and the regulations 
of many participants, including the United States, incorpo-
rate virtually the complete text of Industrial List entries. 
Thus, the United States "Commerce Control List" is based 
substantially upon the CoCom Core List, and the U.S. 
"Munitions List" is based substantially upon the CoCom 
Munitions List. 
B. Effect of Co Com Prior to 1990 
Efforts by the United States and her allies to increase 
the effectiveness of the CoCom system led to a series of high-
level meetings among the CoCom partners, culminating in a 
January 1988 meeting at Versailles. The meeting affirmed as 
a basic principle of CoCom that each country has the 
responsibility to ensure effective enforcement of CoCom-
agreed controls on its exports. 
Consistent with the January 1988 commitment to 
increase the effectiveness of controls while shortening the 
control list, a CoCom working group developed a "common 
standard" with respect to licensing and enforcement. This 
common standard was endorsed by CoCom as guidance to 
enable all member governments to achieve any needed con-
trol program improvements. The common standard repre-
sented agreed minimum elements that must be present for an 
effective control system. 
CoCom confidentiality cloaks the details of the com-
mon standard. The major elements, however, are assumed to 
include: (1) licensing requirements (e.g., control list, regula-
tions, industry awareness), (2) documentation (license appli-
cation, import certificate/end use statement, technical sup-
port documentation), (3) enforcement, and (4) cooperation. 
C. Changes in CoCom Since 1990 
The dramatic changes in superpower relationships 
combined with the fact that there are fewer and fewer "sole 
source"countries for commercially exchanged goods and 
know-how has caused some commentators to question the 
continuing relevance of CoCom.39 This questioning of 
CoCom's effectiveness comes as the countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union are viewed more as new 
commercial markets than as a military threat. 
In June 1990 CoCom conducted a High-Level Meet-
ing ("HLM") to discuss the liberalization of export controls. 
CoCom agreed to a "special procedure" for exporting to 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, removing them from 
the "controlled" category and allowing them to receive 
exports of western high-technology.40 Political develop-
ments and development of the capacity and commitment to 
safeguard sensitive exports are the considerations for remov-
ing a country from controlled status. 
In addition, it was agreed to redraft the CoCorn 
Industrial List. Starting with a blank slate, technical experts 
determined which items were necessary to maintain the 
West's existing strategic advantage in high-technology over 
that of the former Soviet Union. A new "Core List" 
approved by CoCom in May 1991, greatly reduced multilat-
eral East-West controls.41 The "Commerce Control List" 
was restructured in September 1991.42 This was done to 
follow the structure of the newly agreed to "Core List." 
In 1990, the United States and other members of 
CoCom approved nearly 1600 export licenses for shipments 
of high-technology goods to the Soviet Union worth about 
$1.7 billion, including high-speed computers to be used to 
improve the safety of Soviet nuclear power plants.43 This 
marked the third consecutive rise in exports, and a dramatic 
increase over approved exports worth nearly $250 million in 
1987.44 
III. A Case Study: Exporting Telecommunications 
Systems to Russia . 
A. Introduction 
The telephone system in the former Soviet Union grew 
out of a collection of regional networks using copper wires, 
built under Stalin in the 1930's. Unlike Eastern Europe, the 
territory of the former Soviet Union does not have a reason-
able pre-World War II infrastructure on which to build new 
communications links.45 Today, making inter-regional or 
inter city calls is problematic and it is almost impossible for 
a caller from the West to reach someone in one of the former 
Soviet republics.46 
In the next century, telecommunications could do for 
Russia what the railroad did for the United States 200 years 
ago. Fiber optic cables, introduced in the United States in the 
early 1980's, are lines capable of carrying huge amounts of 
digital data across long distances. Fiber optic technology 
revolutionized the way American companies do business. In 
addition to its many civilian uses, fiber optic cables are also 
acknowledged to have important military uses. Defense and 
intelligence agencies hold fiber optics responsible for the 
high-technology advantage the West holds over the East. 
In 1986, the Soviet Union formed the Svetovod Re-
search Institute to develop fiber optic technology. 47 After 
three years it achieved virtually nothing, clearly demonstrat-
ing the effectiveness of CoCom' s export restrictions on fiber 
optic technology and the Soviet Union's dependence on the 
West for high-technology goods and know-how. Other 
options for modernizing communications are not as viable as 
fiber optics. Digitizing, an upgrade of the lines without new 
fiber optic cables, would be time consuming.48 Mobile 
communications and satellite operations are not capable of 
fully covering the vast territory of Russia. Thus, fundamen-
tal to the future development of Russia and the former 
Republics of the Soviet Union is the improvement of tele-
communications and the installation of fiber optic cables. 
Until recently, the United States and her allies, acting 
through CoCom, have maintained tight restrictions on the 
export of high-technology to communist countries. How-
ever, the remarkable changes in the political structure of the 
Soviet Union over the past year persuaded the members of 
CoCom to redraft their export control policy. At the center 
of the debate over reducing the types of controlled items was 
fiber optic technology, an item useful for both commercial 
and military applications. This debate highlighted the vastly 
different positions that the United States Government took 
against the European Allies and American industry in view-
ing the West's role in assisting the former Soviet Union to 
make the transition from communism to democracy. 
B. Reasons/or Change 1989-1990 
After taking control of the Soviet Union in 1985, 
Mikhail Gorbachev oversaw the drastic political reforms of 
Eastern Europe and by 1991, the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. As early as 1988, Western policy makers were 
willing to reconsider their export control policies in order to 
assist the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe 
make the transition to democracy and free markets.49 By 
1989, the European members of CoCom were anxious to 
liberalize exports, but expressed frustration at the perceived 
reluctance of the United States, which advocated a more 
gradual change for security reasons. 
Responding to the concerns of U.S. allies, President 
Bush ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("JCSj to conduct 
a study on dual use export controls and reevaluate the 
strategic threat posed by the U.S.S.R. On February 14, 
1990, CoCom held a two day meeting in Paris to begin a 
review of rules in the first move towards relaxing parts of the 
40 year old system of curbs on the sale of high tech goods to 
Warsaw Pact countries. In May of 1990, the White House 
released a statement on the conclusion of the JCS report that 
a complete overhaul of the list was warranted.so The allies 
were somewhat surprised, but, nevertheless, encouraged by 
the position of the United States. 
C. Agreement to Liberalize Export Controls 
Following up on its February meeting, CoCom held 
aHigh-Level Meeting in Paris on June 6-7, 1990. The United 
States put forth several proposals intended to preserve the 
system of CoCom while making it more flexible. The 
proposals were widely accepted and agreement was reached 
on drastically streamlining the current "Industrial List" of 
controlled dual use products. 51 At the conclusion of the 
HLM, agreement was reached on a liberalization program 
which would: 
(I) replace the current list of controlled items, the 
Industrial List, with a "Core List" of key technolo-
gies and goods to be drawn up from scratch, i.e., a 
blank slate; 
(2) delete 1/3 of the Industrial List entries; 
(3) decontrol certain priority sectors, e.g., comput-
ers, machine tools and telecommunications; 
(4) develop special procedures for countries repre-
senting a lesser strategic threat; and 
(5) renew the commitment to the "common stan-
dard" level of effective protection. 52 
Technical experts were given until December 1990 to draft 
the new "Core List" of restricted exports. American indus-
try voiced its approval of the position and leadership that the 
United States Government showed towards relaxing export 
controls and opening potentially huge commercial markets. 
The enthusiasm of the telecommunications industry, how-
ever, was cut short when the Department of Commerce 
blocked a plan by a consortium led by the American telecom-
munications company U.S. West to lay a fiber optic link 
across the entire length of the Soviet Union. 
D. Dispute Over Fiber Optics 
Despite intense industry lobbying efforts, the United 
States announced on February 14, 1991, that restrictions on 
exports of fiber optic equipment to the Soviet Union would 
continue until the domestic situation "settles into a more 
predictable and promising pattern. "53 Then Deputy Na-
tional Security Adviser RobertM. Gates, speaking before the 
Electronics Industries Association, stated that "[w]e simply 
must hold the line on approvals to ship [technology and 
goods] that could dramatically enhance Soviet strategic 
capabilities. '>$4 
At the end of February, the United States and her allies 
decided to postpone the second CoCom HLM, originally 
scheduled for December 1990 to approve the draft "Core 
List," because of continuing differences over trade in tele-
communications equipment and related technology. 55 The 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom failed to 
resolve their differences with a group of other countries, led 
by France and Germany, over the export of fiber optic 
telecommunications equipment to the Soviet Union. 56 These 
countries protested the United States' proposal to limit fiber 
optic sales to equipment capable of transmitting data at 45 
megabits per second or less, because they claimed that this 
equipment was no longer produced in the West. 57 
The HLM was finally held on May 23, 1991. At a one-
day meeting held in Paris, the United States and her allies 
reached agreement on a new "Core List," scheduled to take 
effect on September 1991.58 The Core List brought about a 
50 percent reduction in the existing controls, in addition to the 
33 percent reduction agreed to by CoCom in June 1990, for 
a total reduction of 83 percent. 59 
United States industry again expressed its disappoint-
ment. 60 Although pleased with progress on avionics, semi-
conductor manufacturing equipment, and machine tools, 
industry spokespersons expressed disappointment at the lack 
of progress made on telecommunications and computers.61 
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The Bush Administration responded that the new "Core 
List" now contained "only the most critical goods and 
technologies that are essential in maintaining the existing 
significant gaps between Western and Soviet based military 
systems. "62 The government also pointed out that the May 
24th agreement would enable the Soviet Union to upgrade its 
telephone system to the standard of the United States in the 
early 1980's.63 This would include phones that work, 
cellular equipment, and facsimile machines - a significant 
improvement over the current state of affairs. 
E. The Final Breakup of the Soviet Union 
On August 19, 1991, an attempted coup by communist 
hardliners failed to oust Gorbachev from government. This 
surprising tum of events appeared to justify the United States 
reluctance to approve high-technology exports of a military 
significance to the U.S.S.R. A delay in the relaxation of 
export controls was expected in the wake of the Soviet 
crisis.64 The final Core List, however, was published as 
scheduled on September 1, 1991, 
and the necessary member country 
NSA's position was significantly strengthened by the Per-
sian Gulf War. Although the United States' military was 
able to deactivate most ofIraq's telecommunication system 
during that war, they were unable to knock out the country's 
fiber optic network, which helped President Saddam Hussein 
maintain links with his military commanders in the south. It 
is acknowledged that, in times of war, the only way to take 
out a fiber optic system is to drop a bomb and sever the 
cable.70 
Still, the National Association of Manufacturers 
(''NAM'') expressed its grave concern over the lack of 
progress in telecommunications negotiations. "Of particu-
lar concern to American industry is the apparent working 
assumption of the United States Government that there is no 
feasible distinction to be made between civil and military 
uses for telecommunications equipment," said aNAM paper 
sent to the Department of Commerce at the beginning of 
1991.71 "We firmly reject the contention that any modern-
ization of the Soviet public telephone network [through the 
use of fiber optics equipment] 
poses a threat to U.S. national 
regulations effectively put the list 
into action.6s "The United States 
security because of an as-
sumed benefit to Soviet mili-
tary communications. ''72 The failed coup precipitated 
the breakup of the Soviet Union and 
in September of 1991 the Baltic 
republics finally regained their in-
dependence. With the new Core 
List in place and the break up of the 
Soviet Union a reality, American 
businesses were anxious to enter 
these new commercial markets. 
American industry representatives 
sent a team to investi-
gate Carl Zeiss Jena 
and the sale to the 
Pressured by Congress, 
American businesses and Eu-
ropean allies, the Bush Ad-
ministration began to rethink 
export control curbs on the 
sale of advanced telecommu-
nications equipment, comput-
ers and space satellites to the Soviet Union. " 
were concerned that U.S. businesses 
were losing a competitive advantage to their overseas coun-
terparts, especially Germany and France, whose govern-
ments were actively supporting investment in the Soviet 
Union. 66 
On September 25, 1991 the Congressional Subcom-
mittee on International Economic Policy and Trade heard 
testimony on allowing the sale of fiber optic technology to the 
Soviets.67 The United States Government continued to argue 
that exporting high-speed fiber optic equipment to the Soviet 
Union would enable the Soviet military to compromise U.S. 
intelligence gathering operations.68 An important issue for 
the government was the fate of non-public networks - fre-
quencies still occupied by the military and a key factor in 
mobile networks. 69 
The National Security Agency ("NSA") led the oppo-
sition within the United States Government against relaxing 
controls on high-tech telecommunications equipment. The 
agency, which gathers intelligence primarily through elec-
tronic interception, argued that the Soviet military could use 
fiber optic networks to avoid interception of traffic. The 
Soviet Union. At the end of 
1991, Gorbachev agreed to 
step down from the leadership of the Soviet Union, and the 
Russian flag was raised over the Kremlin. With the Soviet 
Union dissolving into fragments of the old republics, some in 
the defense/intelligence community changed their position, 
arguing that it may be better for the Soviet Union's military 
high command to have better communication to prevent 
misuse of nuclear weapons by breakaway republics.73 
F. A Loophole Found and Exploited 
A significant event in the debate over exports of fiber 
optics occurred in November 1991. A German manufac-
turer, Carl Zeiss Jena, sold high-speed fiber optic cable to the 
Soviet Union using a loophole in Western trade restrictions.74 
The company, located in what used to be East Germany, sold 
more than 600 miles of fiber optic cable to Moscow, taking 
advantage of an exemption in the trade regulations for 
Eastern European manufacturers that had done business 
with the Soviet Union in the past. The United States sent a 
team to investigate Carl Zeiss Jena and the sale to the Soviet 
Union. If the cable was actually produced on the territory of 
fonner East Germany, then the CoCom restrictions would 
not apply. The United States team was to investigate whether 
a mere transfer had been made.7S 
At the same time, the United States began intensive 
consultations with her allies on plans to eventually ease long-
standing restrictions on high tech exports to the republics of 
thefonner Soviet Union. 76 On February 7, 1992, at a CoCom 
working group meeting, three European countries, Germany, 
Netherlands, and Italy, proposed that the members drop 
virtually all restrictions on exporting civilian telecommuni-
cations gear. Eight other European nations supported the 
proposal.77 The United States withheld its support, presum-
ably awaiting a report from its investigation of the Carl Zeiss 
Jena sale. 
Finally, on March 6,1992, the United States reached 
a tentative agreement with Europe and Japan to loosen 
international controls on exports of advanced telecommuni-
cations equipment. The products covered by the agreement 
included high-quality fiber optic cables.78 Despite prior 
concerns of the intelligence and defense communities, the 
United States decided to strengthen the economies of the 
fonner Soviet republics and to lay a foundation for American 
business activity there. 
IV. Conclusion 
The political changes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union were swift and dramatic. Remaining in place, how-
ever, was an export control system designed to withhold 
critical western technology from the communist countries in 
order to protect national security interests. European allies 
and American businesses were the first to advocate a relax-
ation in high-technology exports. While obviously anxious 
to take advantage of new commercial markets, they effec-
tively argued that the technology was necessary if the for-
merly communist countries were to make a successful tran-
sition to democracy and free market economies. 
Fiber optic telecommunications equipment became the 
focus of the debate over international cooperation in export 
controls. Because the nature of the technology made it useful 
for both civilian and military applications, the United States 
Government at first adamantly opposed the exportation of 
fiber optic technology. Beginning in the fall of 1991, 
however, a strong lobbying effort from American industry 
and pressure from European allies caused the United States 
to rethink its position. The final "straw" appeared to be the 
sale of a fiber optic cable from a German company to the 
Soviet Union. Realizing that American companies had the 
most to gain from allowing sales of fiber optic technology, 
the United States made a basic shift in policy in March of 
1992. As this case demonstrates, any effective liberalization 
of export controls in the future hinges on the concept of 
differentiation, whereby export controls will be decided on a 
country-by-country basis, balancing the benefit of the tech-
nology against real concerns for national security. 
Endnotes 
I"Dual use" items are those which have civil uses but which can 
readily be utilized in military applications, or are deemed to have 
strategic significance. The term "items" is used to refer to all that 
is subject to export control, which includes equipment, materials, 
software and technology. 
2"CoCom" stands for the Coordinating Committee for Multilat-
eral Export Controls. It is the framework in which the United 
States cooperates with other nations in order to effectively enforce 
export controls for national security reasons. 
'U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
4'fhe most important statutes affecting exports include the follow-
ing: Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-
44. implemented in Foreign Assets Control Regulations 
("FACR"), 31 C.F.R 500-30 (maintained by the Department of 
Treaswy, Office of Foreign Assets Control, controlling certain 
exports to, and financial transactions with. named countries); 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 ("AECA"), 22 U.S.C. §§ 
2751-96. implemented in International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions ("IT AR"), 22 C.F.R 120-130 (maintained by the Depart-
ment of State, Office of Defense Trade Control. regulating the 
export of defense articles and services "inherently military in 
character"); Export Administration Act of 1979 ("EAA"). 50 
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420, implemented in Export Administra-
tionRegulations ("EAR"), 15 C.F.R 768-99 (maintained by the 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 
providing the organizational structure for the export control 
system and controlling the export of "dual use" items). 
'50 U.S. C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1988 & Supp. I 1989, Supp. IT 1990, 
Supp. ill 1991). The EAA of 1979 was amended in 1981, Pub. 
L. 97-145,95 Stat. 1727 (Dec. 29,1981), extensively amended in 
1985 by the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985. 
Pub. L. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (July 12. 1985), and by the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Pub. L. 100-418, 102 
Stat. 1107 (Aug. 23, 1988). 
6Id 
7Exec. Order No. 12214.3 C.F.R 256 (1981), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2403 note (1988). 
815 C.F.R 768-99 (1991). 
950 U.S.C. app. § 2402 ("Congressional declarntion ofpolicy"). 
1°50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (authorizing the President to 
impose national security export controls "to restrict the export of 
goods and technology which would make a significant contribu-
tion to the military potential of any other . . . countries which 
would prove detrimental to the national security of the United 
States"). 
1150 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(B) ("to further significantly the 
foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared 
international obligations"). 
For example. items integral to the production of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons. missile technology, or aiding 
in terrorist activities have been deemed by the United States to be 
important to control either unilaterally or in co-operation with 
other countries for reasons offoreign policy. 
1250 U.S.C. app. § 2404(i) (in recognition of the effectiveness of 
multilateral controls for national security, this section authorizes 
the President to enter into negotiations with the other govern-
ments to accomplish uniform enforcement measures). 
1350 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(national security controls -authority). 
1450 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(5)(A). 
IS50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b). 
1615 C.F R 799 ("Conuoodi1y Control List and Related Matters"). 
1'15 CPR § 799.1(a). 
I'22C.FR § 120.3. 
11122 U.S.C. §§ 2751-96 (1988). 
20Jbis offioo, fonnerly known as the Office m Munitions Control, 
maintains the regu1ations implementingthe AF£Aknownasff AR, the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 22 C.F R §§ 120-28. 
2122 CPR § 121. 
22See e.g. Charles A Duelfer, Defense Export Ccntrols, 
1 Cq>ing with U.S. Export Controls 1992 311 (Practising law Inst. 
1992); JoelL. Johnson, CommodityJurisdicJion: Stote or Commerce?, 
1 Cq>ing with U.S. Export Controls 1992 319 ~cing law Inst. 
1992). 
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CPR § 799 (1991). 
24See infra notes 35-36. 
2S15 C.FR § 770 (Supp.l). 
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2850 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(bX1), 2415. 
2915 CPR § 785.2(a)(1). 
:lIlSee supra note 2 (defining "CoComj. 
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3115 CPR § 786. 
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notsubjcct tovalidatedlicensi.ngmaybeshipped mxJera GeneralLioonse 
G-DEST. 15 CPR § 771.3. Exportsofteclmologyand&Jftwarethatwill 
bepublicly awilablemay be shipped undera General License GIDA 15 
CPR §779.3. ExportsnotcoverecilmdenGIDAmaybeshippedeither 
under a General Lioonse GIDR, which requires written ~
against prolubitfdre-exports, or under a General license GIDU, which 
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~.15 CPR §771.1. 
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financing programs to eosurethatthenew Soviet tdepOOoenetMllk will 
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